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ing the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the resulting search for new forms of subjectivity. The historical setting of the novel is the relatively late emergence of Austrian culture into the modern world: not only the perpetuation of Habsburg aristocracy in the twentieth century but also its general cultural lag behind the rest of Europe that, for example, the Secession movement sought to remedy. In terms of form, MusiFs literary modernism is evident in his abandoning the conventional narrative structure of the bildungsroman for an experimental technique in which numerous, unsubordinated plots provide a series of occasions for discursive meditations on a range of topics from a range of perspectives.
Balancing his place in the development of modernist fiction?and helping configure his participation therein?is MusiFs role in the early twentieth-century critique of philosophical modernism. Initially trained as a mechanical engineer, Musil earned a doctorate with a dissertation on Ernst
Machs positivism before beginning a career as a literary journalist and novel ist. MusiFs intellectual production is never far from the intersection of these scientific, philosophical, and literary commitments, and they combine and interact in ways that overcome the individual limitations of these discourses.
Thus, MusiFs critique of Machean positivism, as well as the thematic and formal analogues of that critique found in his fiction, are instances of an engagement with characteristic features of modern philosophical thought, chief among them the tendency toward what Stephen Toulmin has termed "the hidden agenda of modernity," i.e., method, certainty, and universality.1
As early as 1905, Musil expresses a dissatisfaction with both artists and philosophers?the former being insufficiently philosophical, and the latter being insufficiently human.2 Later, in Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, he for mulates the limitations of science as well as art by asking: "Ein Mann, der die Wahrheit will, wird Gelehrter; ein Mann, der seine Subjektivitat spielen lassen will, wird vielleicht Schriftsteller; was aber soil ein Mann tun, der etwas will, das dazwischen liegt?" ["A man who wants the truth becomes a scholar; a man who wants to give free range to his subjectivity may become a writer; but what should a man do who wants something in between?"]. 3 With the form of the essay, Musil begins to carve out a discursive space between science and art to compensate for the inability of conventional sys tematic thought to comprehend the complex, chaotic phenomena of human experience. Far exceeding the genre conventions of his career as a literary journalist, Essayismus [essayism] becomes for Musil the distinctive narrative technique of Der Mann ohne Etgenschaften, the experimental novel on which he worked for more than twenty years and is essayistic in a far deeper sense than its provisionality. Even more than configuring the narrative technique of his life's work, Essayismus develops within Musil's oeuvre as a strategic dis cursive alternative to the modernism of late Enlightenment philosophy. Seen in this light, Musil's work can be ranged with other so-called postmodern attempts to address the limitations of philosophical modernism. Articulat ing Musil's place among critiques of philosophical modernism suggests a number of resources for engaging the problematics of postmodernism itself or, rather, for preventing the aporia of modernism from developing in the direction of canonical versions of postmodernism.
The task of the present essay, then, is to read Musil into the philosophical discourse of modernity as a way of exploring new contexts for his reception within debates about postmodernism. Those new contexts provide loci at which to gauge Musil's attempts within the cultural project of modernity to create normativity out of his own moment without, however, recurring to subject-centered reason. Reading Musil into the philosophical discourse of modernity reveals his affinities with and distance from both the Frankfurt School's critique of instrumental reason as well as poststructuralism's radical critique of the subject and points to what, following Bruno Latour, might be called their nonmodern alternatives.4 Because Musil tries neither to lift himself outside the philosophy of the subject with the lever of antiscience, nor to destabilize it from within, but reimagines the moment of modernity without modernity's own self-privileging, the discursive strategy he develops exhibits features significantly different from the versions of postmodernism already on offer. To evaluate that distance, it is first necessary to characterize Musils participation in the cultural project of modernity and its entangle ments.
The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity
Recognizing that Musils contributions to aesthetic modernism are inter twined with his dissatisfaction with philosophical modernism, we can begin to gauge the quality of his response to the intersection of these inheritances by first clarifying, provisionally, what is meant by philosophical modern ism. Jurgen Habermas begins The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity by articulating modernity's consciousness of time: its sense of rupture with the past occasioned by the discovery of the New World, the Renaissance, and the Reformation as "three monumental events around the year 1500 [which] constituted the epochal threshold between modern times and the middle ages."5 The enduring cultural problematic that is modernity is launched by this sense of rupture: breaking from the past, "[m]odernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself (Habermas, Philosophical Discourse, 7) . Put another way, the goal of the cultural project of modernity is to generate criteria of the good, the true, and the beautiful without reference to either transcendental authority or past historical configurations.
According to Habermas, modernity s task of generating normativity out of itself becomes the very problem of philosophy per se: "The anxiety caused by the fact that a modernity without models had to stabilize itself on the basis of the very diremptions it had wrought is seen by Hegel as 'the source of the need for philosophy"' (16). Accordingly, Hegel is the first to treat the problem of modernity as a specifically philosophical problem. Forced to derive normativity out of itself, modernity?more specifically, modern philosophy?takes the form of self-consciousness. According to Habermas, "Hegel sees the modern age as marked universally by a structure of self-relation that he calls 'subjectivity': 'The principle of the modern world is freedom of subjectivity, the principle that all the essential factors present in the intellectual whole are now coming into their right in the course of their development,,, (16). Modernity thus seeks the criteria for the good, the true, and the beautiful through self-reflection, giving rise to its structural principle, namely, subjectivity?that is, the activity by which the subject makes an object of itself for itself. Habermas points out that the self-conscious structure of modernity is "grasped as such in philosophy, namely, as abstract subjectivity in Descartes's cogito ergo sum and in the form of absolute self-consciousness in Kant. It is the structure of a self-relating, knowing subject, which bends back upon itself as object, in order to grasp itself as in a mirror image?liter ally in a 'speculative' way" (18). On Habermas s reading, modern philosophy, therefore, instantiates the principle of subjectivity while configuring itself as the philosophy of subjectivity. Put slightly differently, philosophy, in becom ing modern, reifies itself as subject-centered reason.
Habermas points out that Hegel was troubled that this new "religion" of reflection reproduced the very same kind of positivities Enlightenment philosophy was meant to counteract in orthodox religion. Thus, "Hegel contends against the enlighteners that the pure religion of reason is no less an abstraction than the fetishized beliefs, for it is incapable of interesting the heart and of having influence upon the feelings and needs. It, too, comes down to a private religion because it is cut off from the institutions of public life and arouses no enthusiasm" (26). Neither orthodox religion nor Enlight enment reason, it turns out, is capable of "shaping religion into the ethical totality of an entire nation and of inspiring a life of political freedom," which is necessary for carrying forward the project of modernity's self-grounding (26). For this reason, Habermas characterizes the paradox of the Enlighten ment by pointing out that "the principle of subjectivity engenders positivity, which, however, calls forth the objective need for its own overcoming" (17) .
The result is the so-called dialectic of Enlightenment: the self-overcoming of subject-centered reason.
Hegel's own understanding of this paradox took shape as a concern that modernity's structure of subjectivity generates subject-object relations that fragment the ethical totality of a society, thereby elevating the finite self above the unified collective. Habermas characterizes this ascendance of the individual subject by pointing out that for Hegel, "in the modern world emancipation became transformed into unfreedom because the unshackling power of reflection had become autonomous and now achieved unification only through the violence of a subjugating subjectivity" (32-33). That is, the principle of subjectivity expresses itself as an activity of reflection which give rise to subject-object relations in which all not-self entities are subsumed under the objectifying power of a finite subject. According to Habermas, HegeFs solution was to replace such a subjugating subjectivity with an "ab solute self-relation of a subject that attains self-consciousness from its own substance and has its unity within itself as the difference between the finite and the infinite" (32-33).
It is worth recalling this history in order to recognize that the problem of domination occasioned by subject-centered reason continues to be at the center of critiques of philosophical modernism. According to Habermas, the critique of a reason grounded in a principle of subjectivity holds that such a version of reason denounces and undermines all unconcealed forms of suppression and exploitation, of degradation and alienation, only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of rationality. Because this regime of a subjectivity puffed up into a false absolute transforms the means of consciousness-raising and emancipation into just so many instru ments of objectification and control, it fashions for itself an uncanny immunity in the form of a thoroughly concealed domination. (56) The domination of a subjugating subjectivity persists as long as one remains committed to carrying out the project of modernity along the path of subject centered reason. This awareness has occasioned attempts, beginning with Nietzsche, to step outside subject-centered reason (e.g., Foucault While he shares Foucault s and Derridas concern about the dangers of subject-centered reason, Habermas is deeply skeptical about so-called postmodern attempts to overcome philosophical modernism by either an archeology/genealogy of discursive formations or a critique of metaphysics:
"Even on methodological grounds I do not believe that we can distantiate Occidental rationalism, under the hard gaze of a Active ethnology of the present, into an object of neutral contemplation and simply leap out of the discourse of modernity" (59). In general, Habermas remains suspicious that "postmodern thought merely claims a transcendental status, while it remains in fact dependent on presuppositions of the modern self-understanding that were brought to light by Hegel" (4) . Reluctant to abandon the project of modernity, Habermas s effort is to work back through the discourse of modernity to identify paths not taken. The paths to which he turns his at tention have to do with versions of non-subject-centered rationality?those that necessarily involve intersubjective considerations?insisting that "the paradigm of the knowledge of objects has to be replaced by the paradigm of mutual understanding between subjects" (295). Musils quest for new discursive techniques with which to engage the problem of normativity emerges most clearly in a distinction he makes between "morality" and "ethics" that is in turn grounded in the different modes of rationality associated with each. For Musil, the moralist system atizes existing precepts while the ethicist investigates new content.7 This distinction between morality and ethics is further elaborated in terms of the individuality of ethical experience. Thus, in addressing the question "What is ethical experience?" Musil notes that there are generally two groups of experiences: those that can be both fixed and transferred, and those that cannot. MusiFs appeal to the notion of transferability recalls his work in experimental psychology under Carl Stumpf in Berlin demonstrating that the stimuli of sense impressions can be quantitatively fixed even when their subjective experiences are different: "Ein Rot von x ist subjektiv gewifi verschieden, aber es ist fixiert" ["A red of x is certainly different subjec tively, but it is fixed"] {Tagebucher, 1:646; Diaries, 313). Ethical experiences, Musil maintains, cannot be fixed in this sense precisely because the source of ethics is the (subjective) individual.
In insisting that ethical experience arises in the individual, Musil reenacts the modernist gesture of generating normativity out of ones own self/moment; however, he remains suspicious of a finite subjectivity raised via false methodological certainty to an overblown objectivity: "Hier heilk es, aus der Logiku. Erkenntnistheorie ohne Fehler herauskommen!" ["Here the issue is how one goes beyond logic and epistemology without making an error."] {Tagebucher, 1:645; Diaries, 313). He is thereby not only engaged in the cultural project of modernity; he is entangled in its enduring contra dictions as well. The discursive strategy Musil develops to negotiate these entanglements?Essay ismus?breaks the pattern of subject-centered reason by abandoning the model of a finite subject elevated to false objectivity by reconfiguring both its subjective and objective poles. Thus, while Musil maintains that the individual is the source of ethics, the individual he has in mind is crucially not the Cartesian subject of subject-centered reason but a textual subject instituted through the discursive praxis of Essay ismus.
Similarly, Essayismus reshapes the operations of subject-centered reason itself, dispensing with its quest for certainty and universality while preserving a kind of rigor central to critical instincts of modernity.
Essayismus and Textual Subjectivity
Though difficult to isolate, MusiFs Essayismus is shaped in two dimensions: as a discursive strategy for engaging the complexities of human (primarily ethical) experience and as a mode of subjectivity (dramatized, for example, in the character of Ulrich). Both arise in, though are developed far beyond, a conception of the essay as a form of writing. In addition to naming a discursive strategy for engaging the irregular com plexities of human experience, Essayismus characterizes the condition of a subjectivity suspended amid a network of determining forces. This mode of subjectivity is that of a textual subject.
The disconnection of a free-floating complex of feelings and ideas from the protagonist is given by the novel's title and even more clearly by the title As both discursive strategy and mode of subjectivity, Musil develops
Essayismus as a way out of subject-centered reason by reconceptualizing both poles of the classical epistemological paradigm of subject-object relations. On the one hand, textual subjectivity replaces the Cartesian subject. On the other, such a textual subject is understood to exist not in ontological opposi tion but rather in intertwining engagement with its objects. Musil indicates that all his work could go under the title Versuche einen anderen Menschen zu finden ["attempts to find an other' human being"], indicating the quest for an alternative mode of subjectivity (Tagebucher, 1:663, 667; Diaries, 324).
Critique Without Method
In the combined senses of discursive strategy and mode of subjectivity, Musilian Essayismus simultaneously engages the contingency of knowledge as well as the contingent ontology of the subject. This dual engagement with contingency distinguishes Essayismus from the modern practices of subject-centered reason. By instituting a textual subjectivity figured as an Entdinglichung [dereification] of subject-object relations, Essayismus decouples knowledge production from a Cartesian subject and thereby obviates the subjugating subjectivity Habermas identifies as the enduring problem of subject-centered reason. In neither the case of knowledge nor that of the ontology of the subject, however, is the contingency too irregular or subjective to be calculable. For Musil, the engineer-turned-novelist, some kind of ordered approximation of these complexities remains the goal: "Die ganze Es ist der Weg der Geschichte eben nicht der eines Billardballs, der ab gestofien, eine bestimmbare Bahn durchlauft, sondern er ahnelt dem Weg der Wolken, der zwar auch nach Gesetzen der Physik verlauft, aber ebenso sehr als durch diese beeinflufit wird von etwas, das man wohl nur ein Zusammentreffen von Tatsachen nennen kann.
[The path of history is in fact not that of a billiard ball, which, once struck, follows a predictable course, but resembles rather the path of a cloud, which also follows the laws of physics but is equally influ enced by something that can only be called a coincidence of facts.] {Gesammelte Werke, 2:1374; Precision, 169)
In terms of Essayismus as a discursive strategy within the critical project of modernity, MusiFs approach to ethical experience aims for a precision paralleling the "quantitative gegenseitige Abhangigkeit" Mach advocated in describing natural phenomena. In another parallel to Mach's attempt at placing scientific knowledge on the most rigorous foundation possible, and beginning from an awareness that human experience is too chaotic to be reduced to universal laws, Musil ing" and that "it gets involved with particular cultural artifacts only to the extent to which they can be used to exemplify universal categories" (Adorno, 3) . In particular, Adorno addresses Descartes's requirements that the object be divided into "as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution"; that one conduct one's thoughts "in such an order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, [one] might ascend by little and little ... to the knowledge of the more complex"; and that "one should in every case institute such exhaustive enumerations and such general surveys" that one "is sure of leaving nothing out" (14-15). Descartes's rules of method are designed to guarantee thought's arrival at certainty. Against this background, "[i]t is not so much that the essay neglects indubitable certainty as that it abrogates it as an ideal" (13).
The essay's abrogation of the requirement that objects be divided into as many parts as necessary is grounded in a reluctance to reify as elementary the categories with which conceptual schema attempt to comprehend their objects. The essay refuses, in other words, to accept as a priori the categories with which thought carves up the world. Similarly, the essay dismisses the rule of proceeding from simplest to more complex in the awareness that the world is more complex than the conceptual systems that attempt to comprehend it. Finally, according to Adorno, the essay abandons the goal of exhaustive enumerations on the grounds that such a survey "would be possible only it if were established in advance that the object to be dealt with was fully grasped by the concepts used to treat it"?in short, that the concepts to be applied anticipated all features of the object with nothing left out (15).
Adorno's conception of the essay as an immanent critique of intellectual constructions is thus built around the observation that it uncovers the dis cursive conditions of possibility of those intellectual constructions?namely, the relation between conceptual categories and the objects they engage. In disclosing and holding these categories at arms length, the essay keeps in the foreground the contingency of the practices by which intellectual con structions are shaped in the first place. Adornos example reveals that the essay has built into its discursive operation a sense of its own contingency and that of the objects it engages. One way to read the postmodern critique of philosophical modernism is as an awareness of subject-centered reasons inability to recognize its own contingency. This inability is famously characterized in Foucault s discus sion of Velazquez's Las meninas in The Order of Things }A Failure to recognize one's own contingency is also the theme of Derridas insistence that solitary mental life in HusserFs phenomenology does not exhibit the self-sufficiency of self-presence but is, in fact, inscribed with a structure of difference.15 In this same sense, MusiFs Essayismus also belongs to the postmodern critique of subject-centered reason that makes up the final chapters of the philosophi cal discourse of modernity. The textuality of the subject and the functional understanding of cognitive objects, both instituted by Essayismus, configures that discursive practice as an ongoing remembrance of the contingency of the subject and its objects of knowledge. MusiFs Essayismus thus effects a reconfiguration of subject-object relations that obviates the "subjugating subjectivity" occasioned by the Cartesian subject at the center of subject centered reason.
Modern, Postmodern, and Nonmodern
The term postmodernism may harbor even more ambiguities than modern ism, beginning with the relation to modernism signaled by post. At least two senses of post can be found at work in the term: (1) as that which fol lows modernism, therefore its developmental continuation, and (2) as that which tries to overcome modernism, therefore its supersession. Habermas contends in a precursor essay to The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity that modernity took shape as the separation of the spheres of culture and the subsequent specialization of the forms of rationality inherent to each: cognitive, moral-practical, and aesthetic.16 The project of the Enlightenment became the pursuit of research in each of these spheres according to their internal logics and the application of the results of that research to society for a more rationalized lifeworld ("Modernity," 9).
The trajectory of modernism, however, stalled at the specialization of the spheres of culture, failing to connect the results of research with everyda life. Habermas contends, therefore, that "a reified everyday praxis can be cured only by creating unconstrained interactions of the cognitive with the moral practical and the aesthetic-expressive elements" ("Modernity," 11). This is the goal of his effort to continue the project of the Enlightenment on the basis of a critique of the ascendancy of instrumental reason which prevents the interaction of the cognitive, moral, and aesthetic spheres. This "Philosophie der Tatsachen,'' which Musil regards as the unofficial ideology of the age, corresponds in a number of ways to the instrumental reason attacked by Habermas?most important, in its inability to facilitate the integration of cognitive, moral, and aesthetic spheres of culture. Musil is similarly critical of positivistic rationality's inability to embrace more than the world of natural phenomena:
Teils aus sich selbst, teils wegen der Nachwirkung des klassischen Widerstandes, teils aus Griinden, die spater erst erortert werden konnen, hat sich die neue mit dem Kennwort Tatsachengeist verse At the end of "Der deutsche Mensch als Symptom," in which Musil discusses the inability of the philosophy of facts to rise to a philosophy of life, he gives the fullest account of der andere Zustand as a disposition fundamentally opposed to rationalizing, calculating, goal-oriented activity, estimating, pressure, craving, base anxiety. And as we have already seen, der andere Zustand is Musil's term for the textual subjectivity instituted via Essayismus. Essayismus is, in other words, Musil's discursive strategy o Entdinglichung. But it does not come, as with Habermas, as a reworking of the dialectic of Enlightenment (even though it properly belongs to the project of modernity).
Instead of working back through the philosophical discourse of moder nity to recover paths of intersubjective reason not taken, and then working those forward as a counterfactual completion of the project of Enlighten ment, Musil's strategy is to situate himself, as it were, in the space between the advent of modernity and the point at which the Cartesian rules of The pattern of this reimagining is neither properly "modern," "anti modern," nor "postmodern." As I have tried to show, Musil's engagemen with the problems of modernity aggressively avoids the method, certainty and universality characteristic of modern philosophy since Descartes. On the other hand, Musil's response does not involve a turning away from the philosophy of facts that makes up an important part of philosophica modernism's genome. Because it seeks a discursive strategy for adopting a degree of Genauigkeit in a domain not ordinarily susceptible to systematic ordering, Musilian Essayismus is, therefore, not exactly a version of antimod ernism either. Nor, yet, as discussed above, does it quite conform to either a strategy of developmental continuation or that of supersession associated with the term postmodern. How then can we conveniently indicate his place in the philosophical discourse of modernity? Provisionally, a number of the features discussed above are better captured by Bruno Latour's account of the nonmodern: a refusal to perpetuate the aporia of modernity by replicating the intellectual practices that gave rise to them. For the time being, then, we can think of Musils other postmodernism as a species of nonmodernism while we use his example to explore new paths through the problems of modernity.
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